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Security Sector Reform (SSR) and the Domestic-International Security Nexus

The Role of Public Safety Canada

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In partnership with Public Safety Canada, CIGI organized a two-day workshop on SSR in Ottawa on March 11 and 12, 2010. Attendees included officials from a range of government departments, including Public Safety, Justice, Foreign Affairs, the Correctional Service of Canada (CSC) and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP). Two of the central questions that arose from the seminar, which are the central focus of this paper, are how SSR engagements fit into Public Safety Canada's domestically oriented mandate and how Public Safety Canada could effectively contribute to SSR engagements across the world. CIGI was subsequently commissioned by Public Safety Canada to draft this paper.

In an increasingly globalized world, the distinction between domestic and international security is becoming blurred. Canada now faces security threats from international terrorism, transnational organized crime, pandemic disease, regional instability and the spread of small arms and weapons of mass destruction. In this environment, state fragility — not strength — constitutes the greatest threat to Canadian security. SSR helps to stabilize fragile, failed and post-conflict states and facilitate transitions to peace, stability and democracy; accordingly, it represents a key pillar in international efforts to contain transnational security threats. Through a number of case studies, the paper demonstrates that engaging in SSR abroad can contribute to the domestic security of donor states by eliminating, or at least mitigating, a variety of transnational threats.

SSR is an area where Canada's interests, values and capabilities converge, positioning the country to not only make significant contributions to SSR engagements, but also become a leader in the continued development of the concept. Canada played a key role in the establishment of the SSR model and is now a major stakeholder in

its implementation. In addition to its longstanding contributions to international policing, Canada enjoys comparative advantages over other donors in three historically under-resourced, though critically important, aspects of SSR: the reform of interior ministries; corrections reform; and customs and border reform. Personnel from Public Safety Canada and its portfolio agencies — including the RCMP, CSC, and the Customs and Border Services Agency (CBSA) — are currently contributing their expertise in these areas to SSR missions in Afghanistan, Haiti, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Southern Sudan and other countries across the globe.

Despite the central role it plays in SSR missions abroad, Public Safety Canada lacks the resources and the mandate to support these engagements, relying on internal resource allocations to meet budget and staffing shortfalls. Consequently, the key starting point to expand Canada's ability to support domestic security reforms under the auspices of SSR is to establish a clear mandate for Public Safety Canada and endow it with a defined budget for SSR-related activities, notably the establishment of a deployable capacity of internal and contracted experts to support SSR missions.

INTRODUCTION¹

Over the past decade, the SSR² concept has come to be seen as an essential tool to stabilize fragile, failed and post-conflict states, and facilitate transitions to peace, stability and democracy. It is a product of the growing awareness in the international community, since the end of the Cold War, of the intrinsic link between security and development, and the realization that sustainable development cannot be achieved unless citizens feel secure and have access to justice. In fact, the SSR concept first emerged out of the development community, pioneered by organizations like the United Kingdom's (UK) Department for International Development (DFID), not the traditional security establishment. However, the value of SSR is not limited to its capacity to provide an enabling environment for development programming in impoverished and troubled states. Rather, it can also play a key role in mitigating the export of security threats from those unstable countries to Canada and its allies.

In this era of globalization, instability in one country or region is rarely confined to that area. Whether through the proliferation of weapons, fighters and ideology, or the movement of refugees, pollution and disease, conflict and instability have never been more mobile and agile. By contributing to the stabilization of troubled states and regions, SSR can help to prevent, mitigate or, in the worst case, merely contain such instability, preventing it from feeding security crises abroad. Many of the domestic security and social problems that afflict Canada and its allies are driven, to some degree, by turmoil outside their borders. In Canada, this could take the form of drugs transited through Haiti, radical jihadist

ideology exported from the Middle East and South Asia, or floods of refugees from Sri Lanka. Accordingly, Canada's domestic security does not begin and end at its coastlines and borders. Former German Defence Minister Peter Struck expressed this notion best in his famous and controversial remark — intended to justify Germany's military engagement in Afghanistan — that “Germany's security is also being defended at the Hindu Kush.” Struck was certainly not the first to draw this link between domestic and international security, but this realization has not yet led to a substantial change in the mindsets and approaches of domestic security agencies, nor empowered them to expand their international outlook and footprint. The gradual evolution of our understanding of domestic security presents difficult questions and demands significant innovation in how contemporary states protect their populations.

International security has traditionally been conceived as the domain of national militaries, diplomatic corps and, more recently, development agencies. Today, the overlap or convergence of domestic and international security demands greater involvement of domestic security agencies and assets, most notably the police, in international security interventions and engagements. Preventing the export of transnational criminal networks from fragile states is, for instance, more dependent on the quality of the local police and judiciary as well as the international mentors and advisers sent to train and reform them, than the effectiveness of the military and their foreign advisers. Although SSR missions often prioritize the reform and rehabilitation of the rule of law architecture above all other areas, donor resources to advance such efforts remain underdeveloped.

Substantial police missions have been established in countries like Haiti, Bosnia and Kosovo, but the international community still struggles to deploy the necessary policing capacity to troubled states, particularly

1 The authors would like to recognize the outstanding research assistance of Michael Lawrence, a master's degree student at the Balsillie School of International Affairs and junior fellow at CIGI.

2 Other terms are sometimes used for this concept, including security system reform and justice and security sector reform (J/SSR). For the purposes of clarity, this paper will use security sector reform for SSR throughout.

those facing high levels of insecurity, such as Afghanistan and Iraq. The RCMP's international police assistance is widely acclaimed and respected, not only because of the quality of its personnel, but because of its ability to deploy rapidly and assimilate knowledge and lessons learned from missions.

Moving beyond the police, few states in the world have developed any meaningful standing capacity to assist in the reforms of domestic security ministries and bureaucratic bodies. Whether the US Department of Homeland Security, the UK Home Office or the Canadian Department of Public Safety, major Western domestic security departments and ministries lack the mandate and resources to support SSR abroad, even though their police, justice and corrections personnel are routinely requested and seconded for overseas deployments. This reflects one of the chief dilemmas facing the SSR concept: its focus on governance, in how security agencies are managed and overseen, tends to be treated as secondary to the task of training and equipping security personnel. This has had the effect of undercutting SSR programs, as poorly managed and governed security agencies may be more prone to engaging in the types of abuses of power — corruption, graft and violence — that enflame, rather than contain, instability.

The lack of deployable human capacity on the part of donor states to support reforms of domestic security institutions has driven a growing reliance on the military and private security companies (PSCs) to fill the gap, both of which have disadvantages in this role. Overreliance on the military can promote the militarization of domestic security agencies, while in the case of PSCs, salient questions have been raised about the quality of the assistance they provide and the lack of internal oversight of their work. It is clear that SSR donor states like Canada must expand their capacity to deploy civilian expertise in areas like the rule of law. In this regard, a recent trend

is the creation of civilian pools or rosters of experts, both within and outside states, which can be quickly accessed to support SSR missions. Such initiatives have shown promise, but have yet to achieve the size, scope and sophistication necessary to fill existing gaps.

The militarization and privatization of SSR support is also a reflection of a recent trend in SSR implementation since the September 11 attacks on the United States. Donors have shown an increased proclivity for “quick and dirty” SSR that emphasizes “hard” security issues of counterterrorism, counternarcotics and counterinsurgency, with little consideration of either the fundamental good governance principles of the SSR model or the long-term security and political implications of donor programming for the host country. The securitization of SSR in line with these priorities in Afghanistan and Iraq is motivated more directly by donor security interests than local security imperatives and needs. As stated already, SSR can have distinct security benefits for donor states such as Canada, but if program design is dictated entirely by those domestic security interests, it can distort the SSR process. In multilateral SSR programs, the specific interests of each donor may diverge or conflict, causing confusion and overlap. This can trigger an overemphasis on particular aspects of the security sector perceived as important by donors and an underemphasis on areas of critical importance to the human security of the local population. For SSR to be effective, it must reconcile and unite internal and external interests. Donor engagement in SSR is not an altruistic exercise, but an approach dominated by external interests can be counterproductive for all involved.

While addressing domestic security threats is a compelling reason for donors to engage in SSR abroad, drawing direct and quantifiable causal links between SSR engagements, domestic security trends and indicators will always be difficult. The impact of SSR, both externally

and internally, will invariably be long term and diffuse. Accordingly, it is difficult to justify increased investment in overseas SSR deployments when measured against the immediate impact that can be accrued by domestic investment, whether by deploying more cops on the beat or placing more judges on the bench. Assessing the impact of SSR programs demands long-term, nuanced and textured indicators, which are currently lacking. For instance, increased police assistance to Haiti may, over time, reduce the transit of Latin American narcotics into Canada, but this may take years to show up in statistical analysis and it may be impossible to measure the exact contribution of SSR assistance in relation to other factors. Our desire for quick, straightforward results can be a major obstacle to good programming.

This discussion paper will explore both the impact that SSR can play in reducing domestic threats in Canada, as well as the role that Canadian domestic security agencies can play in advancing SSR programming abroad. The paper will begin by examining the domestic-international security nexus arising from the growing globalization of security and insecurity. The impact of previous SSR initiatives and programs on domestic security conditions in a number of states will be identified. After establishing the role that SSR can play in domestic security, the paper will look at how states such as Canada have selected SSR interventions, asking whether domestic security considerations have played an adequate part in the decision-making process. Finally, the paper will suggest ways that Public Safety Canada can approach SSR, particularly in the way it frames its mandate, organizes its resources and measures its impact.

DOMESTIC-INTERNATIONAL THREAT NEXUS

The September 11 terrorist attacks obliterated the notion that distance and national borders could insulate states

from transnational security threats. A fundamental tenet of the new security regime that emerged in Canada and much of the Western world is that some threats cannot be addressed by domestic policies alone. Domestic security is increasingly affected by threats emanating from beyond national borders, thereby demanding extra-national responses.

Direct threats to a state's domestic security often come from immediate neighbours, a fact that has long dictated how donor attention and funding was allocated. However, threats originating in far-flung and often neglected areas of the globe, the world's "strategic slums," so to speak, challenge the notion that building a "safe neighbourhood" can guarantee security. There is a broad international consensus on the internationalization of domestic security threats, as reflected in the national security strategies of key SSR stakeholders, such as Canada, the United States, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands (see Annex 1 for a comparison).

THREATS FROM ABROAD: A CANADIAN PERSPECTIVE

Although Canada's position as a country with only one neighbour limits its transnational security threats, it remains vulnerable to threats originating further afield. A summary of some of the most pertinent and pressing threats follows.

Failed and Fragile States

Canada's international engagement is founded on the basis of humanitarianism, economic development and human rights. Canadian foreign policy pursues these goals not just for their normative appeal, but also because of their relationship to domestic security in Canada. In light of these guiding principles, Canada is committed

to assisting the world's most vulnerable states.³ A report by the Center for American Progress summarized the threat that failed and fragile states pose regionally and internationally:

Countries and regions in crisis...provide fertile ground for illicit trade, extremist networks, arms suppliers, and money launderers, thus undermining regional, as well as international, security. Countries weakened by unchecked crises are unable to participate effectively in global efforts to address our collective security. Countries in crisis cannot maintain the health infrastructure and systems needed to manage HIV/AIDS or avian flu, prepare to adapt to or mitigate the impacts of climate change, or effectively prevent the exploitation of their territory by terrorists or criminals. (Smith et al., 2008: 6)

Non-functioning states cannot fulfill their responsibilities to international treaties and regimes, let alone uphold their role in the global collective security system, posing an indirect threat to Canada and its allies.

International Terrorism

In 2004, an al-Qaeda statement placed Canada fifth on its list of countries to target with terrorist attacks. Many of the other countries on that list — for instance, Spain, Australia and the United Kingdom — have since been victims of terrorist strikes. The Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) *2008–2009 Public Report* cautions that Canada's good fortune to have avoided terrorist attacks is not "an indication that Canada is immune from the

threat which many other countries have experienced with tragic consequences" (CSIS, 2009: 8).

Transnational Organized Crime

Transnational organized criminal groups threaten Canada's security through trafficking in drugs, arms and human beings, as well as money laundering. Events and circumstances abroad have a direct impact on the nature of organized criminal networks and crime trends in Canada. Canada's heroin market, for example, is now completely dominated by imports from Southwest Asia (RCMP, 2007: 23); Afghanistan's porous borders make the transportation of heroin from Afghanistan to Pakistan and India — and eventually by air to Canada — much easier. Indo-Canadian organized crime groups "remain heavily involved in the importation of heroin to Canada, predominantly through the Vancouver and Toronto international airports" (RCMP, 2007: 23). As with heroin, cocaine trafficking strengthens criminal elements within Canada, with groups utilizing worldwide networks to facilitate drug trafficking. RCMP investigations into cocaine trafficking cited "the involvement of individuals with origins in Latin America, traditional crime groups, and outlaw motorcycle gangs" (RCMP, 2007: 10).

Arms Trafficking

Large-scale arms trafficking does not pose a significant direct risk to Canadian domestic security. Canada's firearm-related homicide rate (0.58 victims per 100,000 population) — though nearly six times lower than the United States (3.40) — is still almost three times higher than Australia (0.22) and six times higher than England and Wales (0.10); however, firearms are still only used in 2.4 percent of violent crime cases in Canada (Dauvergne and De Socio, 2006: 1, 5). Regardless, the relationship between the illicit global trade in small arms and a number of other transnational threats, like organized

³ Canada's 2004 *National Security Strategy* reflects this commitment: "Canadian security will be increasingly dependent on our ability to contribute to international security. This may require the deployment of military assets to protect against direct threats to international peace and security or the provision of development assistance to strengthen public institutions in weak or failing states" (Government of Canada, 2004: 6).

crime and terrorism, that directly and indirectly affect Canada, make the issue highly relevant.

Weapons of Mass Destruction

Canada remains vulnerable to the threat of terrorist groups obtaining and using weapons of mass destruction. Volatility in regions with nuclear-armed states — for instance the Middle East, South Asia and the Korean Peninsula — represents an indirect, but potentially catastrophic, threat to Canadian security.

THE SSR MODEL AND THREAT ELIMINATION/CONTAINMENT

WHAT SSR CAN OFFER

The SSR model is a tool to remove, reduce or contain security threats that fragile, collapsed and conflict-affected states may present to the international system, either because their security sectors are excessively weak and ineffective, or overweight and overbearing. SSR can “expand oversight, transparency and accountability within security institutions; and it can help to reduce corruption, abuses of power, economic mismanagement and impunity within the security and justice spheres” (Sedra, 2010: 107). A more just, accountable, effective and democratic security sector and a functioning justice system can also deny terrorists and organized criminal groups a base of operations; facilitate the state’s incorporation into international anti-terrorism, policing, health and environmental regimes; and create an enabling environment for economic growth.

While international peacekeeping missions work to minimize harm and restore stability in countries that have already reached a crisis state, SSR can be part of a broader strategy of conflict prevention that addresses the

seeds of instability before they evolve into full-grown crises.⁴ It allows donor states to proactively promote stability, rather than merely react to crises. Accordingly, ongoing engagement in SSR in a wide range of contexts, from collapsed states, such as Afghanistan and Somalia, to weak regimes undergoing democratic transitions, such as Colombia and Guatemala, can form a central pillar of a strategic framework to contain threats to Canada’s domestic security.

Containing the transnational threats already outlined, ranging from organized crime to international terrorism to global health crises, requires robust regional and international coordination. SSR programs contribute to the development of the kind of competent, reliable state partners — good global citizens, so to speak — that the international collective security system requires to operate effectively and mitigate risk. Critically, SSR facilitates the forging of stronger bilateral and multilateral relationships between SSR donor and recipient states, facilitating critical consensus on international security issues. Finally, SSR helps to entrench and consolidate international security frameworks and common standards that can facilitate long-term institutional cooperation that does not unduly rely on personal relationships or ad hoc arrangements.

Table 1 on the next page outlines the contribution of various areas of SSR engagement to transnational threat reduction.

4 Public Safety Canada’s 2010–2011 *Report on Plans and Priorities* mentions the need to prevent “to the extent possible, threats from materializing” (Public Safety Canada, 2010: 8). The department’s engagement in Afghanistan is one example of this commitment and, indeed, a general commitment to SSR can be a significant part of a strategy to address threats before they become acute.

TABLE 1: SSR INTERVENTION AND THREAT REDUCTION

| Area of Engagement | Contribution to Threat Reduction |
|----------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Military Reform | SSR can contribute to counterterrorism, counterinsurgency and counternarcotics by professionalizing and modernizing the host country's armed forces, extending the area of the country under government control and enabling the government to re-establish a monopoly over the use of force, closing opportunities for civil war and insurgency. |
| Police Reform* | Police reform is the principal weapon in counterterrorism and counternarcotics operations. Police reform can enhance the host government's ability to confront and dismantle terrorist groups, transnational organized crime groups and traffickers in humans, drugs and arms. A more accountable and community-oriented police force can improve relations with the population, which is vital for counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations. |
| Customs and Border Reform* | Customs and border reform is a frequently overlooked aspect of the broader SSR process. Reform in this area helps limit cross-border threats from trafficking in humans, drugs and arms. Reforms also allow states to take part in global anticrime and antiterrorism efforts by enhancing their ability to track who (and what) enters and exits their borders. Customs and border reform can also generate much-needed revenue by combating illegal smuggling and improving the efficacy of customs collection. |
| Justice Reform | The ability to detain, prosecute and convict members of criminal and terrorist groups is an essential part of a functioning security sector. Justice reform makes a critical contribution to threat reduction by allowing states to properly process dangerous individuals and groups who are captured by their military and police forces. The reform and rationalization of legal statutes and instruments also provides the basis for a sound regulatory framework, which is indispensable for a flourishing domestic economy and can contribute to regional economic health by choking off transitional illicit economic activity. Because it is inherently complex and frequently under-resourced, the justice sector often represents the weak link in wider SSR efforts, limiting SSR's effectiveness in threat reduction. |
| Corrections Reform* | Poorly managed and maintained prisons can become a security threat when they breed resentment and allow terrorist and criminal groups to recruit, plan and project power beyond the prison's walls. Breaches in security can release dangerous terrorists and criminals into society. Moreover, the failure to establish effective rehabilitation systems to reintegrate offenders into society can drive cycles of poverty, crime and violence. |
| Intelligence Reform* | Intelligence agencies can play a vital role in monitoring and disrupting threats to the state from a variety of sources, from terrorists and mafia groups to economic saboteurs and domestic militants. When integrated into broader international intelligence networks, recipient state intelligence bodies can also contribute to the global reduction of threats through the sharing and aggregation of information. Unfortunately, these institutions are often the most secretive and resistant to reform and, in some cases, are engaged in practices that violate international human rights standards. Increasing their effectiveness through the introduction of modern technology, tactics and techniques, coupled with improvements in transparency and accountability through the establishment of oversight mechanisms and more rigorous professional standards, can make a significant contribution to domestic, regional and international security. |
| Oversight/Governance* | Strengthening oversight mechanisms, such as offices of the ombudsman and legislative committees, can pay immediate dividends in improving the human rights situation in the recipient state. Halting abuses by state security forces can help address grievances, promote reconciliation and bolster the legitimacy of the state, eventually benefitting Canada through improved local and regional stability. |
| Institutional Reform* | Reforming the bureaucratic institutions that manage the security sector is often ignored in favour of training individual soldiers and police officers. This can have catastrophic consequences as the newly trained soldiers and police are, in turn, often managed by corrupt, factionalized and ineffective bureaucratic bodies. Failure to make progress at the institutional level threatens progress made at the individual level. Critically, Canada relies on effective counterpart institutions in many international law enforcement regimes based on intergovernmental coordination, such as the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL). |
| Civil Society | Promoting the development of a strong and inclusive civil society provides a country with non-violent methods to articulate and manage grievances. A healthy civil society can also generate grassroots momentum for many of the reforms mentioned above — by campaigning against state corruption, for example. |

*These are areas where Public Safety Canada can play a constructive role.

THE LIMITATIONS OF SSR

SSR as Conflict Prevention

The proclivity of donors to engage in troubled states only after they have descended into a crisis that poses a clear and present danger to their own citizens, their neighbours and the broader international community, has undercut the preventative benefit and potential of SSR. SSR tends to be seen as a post-conflict process, but it is much more versatile. The model is designed to facilitate transitions of many different stripes, whether from state failure and conflict to stability and peace, or from authoritarianism and fragility to a normalized democracy.

Unrealistic Expectations

Donor and recipient expectations for the SSR process are often unrealistic. While the previous section outlined the many potential benefits of SSR programs:

[D]onors and recipients alike often expect SSR to deliver even more, such as bringing peace among warring parties; defeating insurgencies and addressing immediate insecurity; and solving problems of corruption. SSR can contribute to meeting these goals, but it is one tool of many that is needed to do so. It is no panacea or magic bullet for the stabilization of troubled states (Sedra, 2010: 107–108).

Expecting too much from the process can lead to the setting of unrealistic time frames and inadequate contingency planning, not to mention the deleterious impact on local morale if program goals are not met. In general, SSR programs require greater modesty in establishing their goals and greater patience in seeing them through.

Time Frames

SSR is inherently a long-term project. Progress in the host country may be gradual and the dividends in the donor country may take many years or even decades to manifest themselves. Unfortunately, funding mechanisms in donor countries rarely exceed five-year cycles, which can place intense pressure on donor practitioners to contort SSR programs to achieve quick and measurable results. This often takes the form of abandoning the holistic focus of the process in favour of a military-centric train-and-equip approach. After all, it is easy to count how many guns and trainers are provided to a foreign military; it is not so easy to gauge the impact of better governance in the security sector. Patience is needed, not only to achieve desired impacts within the host country, but to detect the broader regional and international security benefits.

When donor states have been able to make rare long-term commitments to state building and SSR projects, there tends to be a widespread acceptance among both politicians and the general public in the donor country that the recipient country poses a direct security or economic threat. For instance, Western European states have been steadfast in their commitments to the reconstruction of the Balkans, due largely to the reality that the troubled region is literally in their backyard, and any renewed conflict or severe instability would have major spillover effects, which could affect all Europeans. If donors like Canada are to make the necessary long-term commitments to SSR projects, missions must be framed within the domestic and international security contexts, making them less distant and more real for politicians and average citizens. This is not a matter of “spin,” as the broader security implications can be traced in almost every case, but making the case for those linkages requires good analytical capacity that is not always present.

National Successes, International Failures

Another problem is that even successful national-level programs can fail to deliver domestic security dividends to donors. Using drug trafficking as an example, a recently published UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) report, *The Globalization of Crime*, cautions that “national successes have often pushed trafficking flows into other countries...with the flow often settling along the path of least resistance, frequently in countries with little capacity to bear the burden of [transnational organized crime]” (UNODC, 2010b: v).⁵

Drug traffickers have been able to change their trafficking patterns — even in a relatively short period of time — in response to changes in national interdiction rates.⁶

International terrorist groups have displayed similar resilience, altering their approaches and tactics to survive

stifling counterterrorism pressure.⁷ SSR programs can be successful in creating a stable security and justice architecture in a state, fulfilling the goal of the program. But this may not fully address the transnational security threat that partially motivated the donor engagement in the first place, as the agent of that threat could adapt to changing conditions. This illustrates the reality that SSR is only one tool the international community can use to deal with transnational security threats; it should be integrated into a broader regional and international strategic framework.

Cost-Effectiveness

In the case of drug trafficking, SSR programs have been linked to reductions in the cultivation of drugs and related trafficking activities; however, international interventions are not always a particularly cost-effective way of addressing domestic drug demand. A RAND Corporation report suggests that strategies based on source-country control produce a far smaller reduction in domestic drug demand than other


⁵ This phenomenon is sometimes called the “balloon effect” — squeeze one part of a balloon and it bulges elsewhere — or, in other words, drug eradication in one area will increase the sale price of the drug, in turn encouraging cultivation elsewhere. This effect can be observed in the cases of Peru and Bolivia, countries who shared an effective monopoly on the cultivation of coca in the 1990s. When coca was largely eradicated from those countries in the late 1990s, cultivation moved to neighbouring Colombia. With Plan Colombia’s drug eradication strategy effectively reducing the coca harvest in Colombia, there is evidence that cultivation is returning to Peru and Bolivia. The UNODC *World Drug Report 2010* reports that “While Colombian traffickers have produced most of the world’s cocaine in recent years, between 2000 and 2009, the area under coca cultivation in Colombia decreased by 58%, mainly due to eradication. At the same time, coca cultivation increased by 38% in Peru and more than doubled in...Bolivia (up 112%)” (UNODC, 2010a: 16).

⁶ In 2006, the US National Drug Intelligence Center reported that less than 1 percent of the 600 to 700 tons of cocaine estimated to flow from South America to the United States in 2006 transited through Central America, with the rest transiting through the Pacific or Caribbean to Mexico. According to a recent STRATFOR report, “land-based shipment of cocaine through Central America appears to have ballooned” since that time (see Miller Llana, 2009).

⁷ After al-Qaeda was dislodged from its stronghold in Afghanistan, the organization shifted resources away from Afghanistan, most notably to the Pakistan border region, but also towards affiliate groups such as al-Qaeda in Iraq, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and al-Shabab in Somalia. Moreover, al-Qaeda and other international Islamist groups adapted to the massive increase in counterterrorist activity and pressure under the auspices of the war on terror by altering their tactics and approaches. For instance, to counter increased electronic surveillance by Western intelligence agencies, al-Qaeda has, in some cases, resorted to more primitive forms of communication, such as the passing of coded notes.

FIGURE 1:

COST OF REDUCING COCAINE CONSUMPTION BY 1 PERCENT WITH ALTERNATIVE COCAINE-CONTROL PROGRAMS, IN US\$ MILLIONS



Source: C. Peter Rydell and Susan S. Everingham (1994). *Controlling Cocaine: Supply Versus Demand Programs: Summary*. Santa Monica: RAND. Reprinted with permission.

strategies based on domestic law enforcement and, in particular, drug treatment (see Figure 1).⁸

Inadequate Mechanisms for Evaluation

A widely recognized weakness of the SSR model is the immaturity of evaluation frameworks and indicators. Reformers have encountered difficulty assessing progress within SSR host states, let alone the second-order impacts of SSR programming on the domestic security environments of donors. Moreover, even if an SSR program is deemed to be an unquestionable

success, it is difficult to precisely evaluate or predict the program's wider impact regionally and internationally, as a range of variables can cloud the picture. For instance, the stabilization of a state through SSR may reduce weapon and drug flows from that state to a donor, but overall trafficking figures in the donor country may not change, due to the emergence of new trafficking sources. This merely points to the need for more comprehensive, sophisticated and long-term analytical systems that will enable donors like Canada to track internal and external impacts of their SSR programming.

CASE STUDIES

The following section will evaluate the ability of SSR programs to address transnational security threats from drug trafficking and organized crime, population displacement and arms trafficking.

⁸ According to the authors of this study, the different tactics are defined as follows: "Source-country control: coca leaf eradication; seizures of coca base, cocaine paste, and the final cocaine product in the source countries (primarily Peru, Bolivia, and Colombia). Interdiction: cocaine seizures and asset seizures by the U.S. Customs Service, the U.S. Coast Guard, the U.S. Army, and the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS). Domestic enforcement: cocaine seizures, asset seizures, and arrests of drug dealers and their agents by federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies; imprisonment of convicted drug dealers and their agents. Treatment of heavy users: outpatient and residential treatment programs" (Rydell and Everingham, 1994). Although the authors do not address SSR programs specifically, their research does reflect the difficulty of advocating for international engagements purely on domestic security grounds.

DRUG TRAFFICKING AND ORGANIZED CRIME

European Union Engagement in the Balkans

One of the early test cases for the SSR model, the European Union's (EU) response to the Balkan crises in the 1990s and early 2000s reinforced the link between domestic security and SSR engagement. The violence and instability in the Balkans threatened to spill over into Western Europe in the form of massive refugee flows and the trafficking of drugs, arms and humans. One of the explicit aims of the SSR process was to contain these threats by confronting them at their source: dysfunctional state structures and security apparatuses. The EU, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) engagements in the Balkans were "aimed at protecting their prosperous democracies against the effects of the region's instability" (Woodward, 2003: 279). There was a conscious decision to "externalize" justice and home affairs policies to the surrounding area, and extend the European Security and Defence Policy to "protect the EU's 'safe' internal space from an 'unsafe' external environment" (Mounier, 2006: 47).

Though the Balkans represents a clear case where the investment in SSR interventions has paid dividends —

the worst-case scenarios of regional destabilization and continued armed violence have been avoided — the experience also illustrates the limitations of SSR.

The specific case of Albania is illustrative because it concerns efforts to contain drug trafficking and transnational organized crime. The UNODC has operated in Albania since 1999, reflecting the international community's concern with the threat of transnational crime. Donors have placed special emphasis on border reform, with various countries and organizations providing assistance. Albania's 2003 *Strategy on Border Control and its Integrated Management* was motivated by "increasing international pressure" (Abazi et al., 2009: 13).

SSR programs have made clear progress in containing some domestic security threats. Recent successes, including progress in implementing an integrated border management (IBM) system, improvements in equipment and training, and better coordination between agencies have made Albania's borders less porous (see UNODC, 2010c). Table 2 displays seizures by the Italian police of drugs smuggled via Albania. The decline in seizures on the Italian side suggests greater counternarcotics and countersmuggling capacity within Albania.

The transnational security threat includes organized crime groups originating in Albania and operating in Western Europe. These groups have long been identified

TABLE 2: DRUG INTERDICTION STATISTICS ACCORDING TO ITALIAN POLICE

| Type | 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 |
|-----------|-----------|----------|----------|----------|---------|
| Heroin | 1085.3 kg | 392.6 kg | 379.2 kg | 173.6 kg | 10.3 kg |
| Cocaine | 3.3 kg | 2.1 kg | 0 | 13.8 kg | 3.3 kg |
| Hashish | 0 | 0 | 30.8 kg | 0 | 0 |
| Marijuana | 801.3 kg | 808.3 kg | 3043 kg | 465.5 kg | 4 kg |

Source: Albanian Ministry of Public Order (quoted in Abazi et al., 2009: 13).

as a threat to Western Europe. In 1998, the Council of Europe wrote in its organized crime situation report that “ethnic Albanian criminal organisations managed to build a Europe-wide network and hold monopolies in urban areas. They maintain operational bases in Austria, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Germany, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and in the Nordic countries” (UNODC, 2007: 65). Despite seven years of active international participation in the Albanian SSR process, the Council of Europe’s 2005 report echoes the same concerns, stating that “ethnic Albanian criminal groups pose a significant threat to the EU because of their involvement in drug trafficking, THB [trafficking in human beings] and money laundering” (UNODC, 2007: 65).

It is reasonable to assume that SSR efforts undertaken in Albania — including legal reform aimed at reducing corruption and specifically tackling organized crime — have placed pressure on these transnational organized crime organizations. It is difficult to prove the link, however, between successes in Albania and improved security conditions in London, Brussels or Berlin.

Despite 15 years of engagement, the Balkans remains the major drug trafficking corridor to Western Europe,⁹ organized crime groups originating in the Balkans operate throughout Western Europe, human trafficking remains rampant and corruption has lingered. The European Union’s engagement in the Balkans has managed to mitigate regional security threats, and has made some tangible contributions to domestic security, especially with respect to drug trafficking, but has been unable to contain entirely the threats to Western European security posed by transnational organized crime groups.

⁹ The UNODC estimates that “about 100 tonnes of heroin crosses southeastern Europe every year on its way to Western Europe, of which 85 tons eventually makes it to the consumer, a flow estimated at \$25-30 billion” (Bradley, 2008).

US Engagement in Mexico

Security sector reform in Mexico, particularly measures to counter the transnational drug threat emanating from its borders, demonstrates both the limitations and pitfalls of security assistance, and the specific type of contribution SSR can make towards domestic security.

The primary vector of security assistance to Mexico is the US Merida Initiative, which earmarks US\$1.4 billion over three years, beginning in 2008, to combat drug trafficking, gangs and organized crime in Mexico, Central America, Haiti and the Dominican Republic. In Mexico, the assistance is largely designed to enhance the state’s military and paramilitary capacity to combat drug cartels,¹⁰ in effect by militarizing its counternarcotics efforts. Over the last few years, the Mexican government has deployed 45,000 soldiers and thousands of federal police in almost a dozen Mexican states to fight the cartels (see Sullivan and Beittel, 2009). By some accounts, this strategy is an effective means of countering the transnational drug threat. The US State Department posits that: “The restructuring of security forces, coupled with the military’s strong engagement in the fight to dismantle major drug trafficking organizations (DTOs), has proven to be effective” (US Department of State, Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, 2009).

The purpose of this militarized approach is to put pressure on the cartels and target their leadership. Critics, however, are quick to stress that the same strategy failed when applied in Colombia in the 1990s. The effort there did not disrupt the flow of drugs, but merely replaced

¹⁰ Funding from the Merida Initiative has been disproportionately weighted towards counternarcotics, counterterrorism and border security initiatives. These areas received US\$306.3 million in funding in 2008 and US\$238.3 million in 2009, much more than the US\$56.1 million in 2008 and US\$158.5 million in 2009 allocated to public security and law enforcement programs. The counternarcotics and counterterrorism funding is also heavily weighted towards military hardware, including eight Bell 412 transport helicopters, costing US\$208.3 million (Cook et al., 2008: 4). For a detailed account of support for, and criticisms of, the Merida Initiative, see Seelke (2009).

two hierarchically structured cartels with over 300 smaller groups, organized in a decentralized, cell-like network better able to evade state law enforcement efforts (see Carpenter, 2009 and 2003: 187–188, 192–193; Payan, 2006: 30–31). Given the complexity of the problem and the scale of the profits to be had, vigorous military enforcement efforts in Mexico are more likely to prompt more sophisticated and elusive forms of drug trafficking than to eliminate the threat entirely.

Mexico's military efforts have had a much more tangible impact on destabilizing the power balance between the cartels, producing unprecedented levels of violence and instability that sometimes spill over the border into the United States (Beittel, 2009; US Government Accountability Office, 2007; Carpenter, 2009). As of August 2, 2010, the Mexican government reported 28,000 deaths from drug-related violence since President Calderón escalated the military campaign in 2006 (BBC News, 2010). A further dilemma is that the Mexican experience shows that assistance through military training can backfire. One of the most brutal drug organizations, Los Zetas, was initiated by deserters from the Mexican military's Special Air Mobil Force Group, who were able to apply inside knowledge of Mexico's security institutions and specialized training in intelligence, weaponry, surveillance operations and, by some accounts, direct US military training (Cook, 2007: 7–8; Meyer, 2007: 6; Beittel, 2009: 4). Finally, the militarized approach to the drug trade has led to human rights abuses and a lack of accountability within state security forces.¹¹ In 2008, Mexico's National Human Rights Commission received over 1,200 complaints of military human rights abuses (Beittel, 2009: 14). A 2009 Human Rights Watch (HRW) report complained that in 70 cases of serious

abuses (including disappearances, killings, torture and rape) documented by the organization, not one has seen a conviction in a military court (HRW, 2009).

The Mexican example demonstrates that, in the case of such a lucrative and complex transnational threat as drugs, SSR cannot be expected to eliminate the threat in the foreseeable future, and an emphasis on military capacity within SSR can produce undesirable — and even counterproductive — results.

What SSR can offer is better understood in terms of its anti-corruption efforts in Mexico, where pervasive state corruption has deeply aggravated the drug threat. In many cases, officials mandated to combat the drug trade have directly perpetuated it. In 1997, President Zedillo's drug czar, General Jesús Gutiérrez Rebollo, whom US drug czar General Barry McCaffrey vouched for as “a guy of absolute, unquestioned integrity,” was convicted for being on the Juárez cartel's payroll (Grayson, 2009: 34). In 2005, President Vicente Fox's administration deployed federal officers to the city of Nuevo Laredo to combat rampant corruption. The federal officers were fired upon by the municipal police, leading to the arrest of 41 municipal officers and the suspension of the entire 700-member force, with less than half being cleared to return to duty (Cook, 2007: 10).

To counter this crippling situation, both the Fox and Calderón administrations have taken concerted efforts to reform the security sector and uproot corruption. President Fox created the Federal Agency of Investigation (AFI) to replace the notoriously corrupt Federal Judicial Police, established the Intersecretarial Commission for Transparency and Combat against Corruption and appointed an “anticorruption czar,” who quickly fired 5,000 public employees for corruption. Calderón has continued these efforts against corruption in his ongoing attempts to merge the AFI and the Federal Preventive Police (PFP) into one vetted agency subjected to drug and

¹¹ George Grayson, an expert on Mexico and its drug wars, notes: “Continued reliance on the military to pursue drug lords is a recipe to amplify corruption and human-rights abuses within the armed forces, an institution that has traditionally enjoyed a high level of public esteem” (see Grayson, 2009: 55).

polygraph testing, as well as extensive background checks (US Government Accountability Office, 2007; Grayson, 2009: 41–42). In June 2007, Calderón replaced 284 federal police commanders hailing from all 31 states in an effort to purge corruption. In 2008, the secretary for public security began to develop means to vet the entire federal police force, as well as units in the state and municipal police (US Department of State, Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, 2009). The Mexican congress also passed key constitutional reform legislation that will overhaul the country's security and judicial apparatus (US Department of State, Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, 2009). The Merida Initiative aims to bolster these efforts with at least US\$73.5 million in funding for judicial reform, institution building, anticorruption and rule of law initiatives (Sullivan and Beittel, 2009: 15).

These security sector reforms are fostering a transition from a corrupt Mexican state that was either assisting the drug trade or utterly unable to act against it towards a capable and transparent state committed to combatting the trade and able to serve as a reliable partner for foreign governments affected by drugs imported from or transited through Mexico. Corruption remains rampant, and this transition is certainly a long-term process, but the shift towards a more stable, accountable and law-bound Mexican state willing to engage the drug threat is a necessary measure for domestic security in both Canada and the United States. Insofar as a transnational threat such as the drug trade demands transnational and cooperative solutions, SSR can make a significant contribution to security in Canada and the United States by fostering a more reliable security architecture in Mexico with which to collaborate, even if the drug threat is unlikely to disappear. Amidst these anticorruption measures, the United States and Mexico already enjoy

an effective collaborative relationship, strengthened through numerous joint initiatives.¹²

POPULATION DISPLACEMENT

Human Trafficking in the Balkans

The US Department of State's annual *Trafficking in Persons Report* has tracked international progress in combatting human trafficking since 2001. The report groups countries into three tiers, according to whether or not they “meet the minimum standards in combating the trafficking of persons” (Tier One), “do not fully meet the minimum standards” (Tier Two) or “do not meet the minimum standards” (Tier Three).

The Balkans have long been a transit route for trafficking in persons, particularly sex workers from Russia and the former Soviet Union to Western Europe. Consequently, human trafficking has been a point of emphasis for bilateral and multi-lateral SSR efforts throughout the Balkans. Combatting human trafficking requires a whole-of-government approach that involves police, customs and border services and courts, as well as cooperation with international bodies like INTERPOL. The US State Department ratings give a sense of the progress made in this area (see Table 3 on next page).

SSR engagement in the Balkans has significantly bolstered the ability of states to combat human trafficking. Each of the countries listed in Table 3 has improved its ranking since 2001, with Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH) registering the most substantial improvement (see Box 1 on the next page). This does not, of course, mean that human trafficking no longer occurs on a large scale in the Balkans; nonetheless, the ratings indicate that international assistance has given these countries the tools to more

¹² For examples, see: US Department of State, Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (2009).

TABLE 3: COUNTRY PERFORMANCE IN COMBATTING HUMAN TRAFFICKING

| Country | 2001 | 2002 | 2003 | 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 |
|----------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|------|------|
| Albania | 3 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2WL | 2 | 2 |
| BiH | 3 | 3 | 3 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 1 |
| Croatia | No Data | No Data | 2 | 2WL | 2 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Kosovo | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | 2 | 2 |
| Serbia | No Data | No Data | 2 | 2WL | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 |
| Slovenia | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |

Note: Starting in 2004, the US State Department included a rating of Tier Two “Watch List” (2WL), indicating that the country was at risk of falling to Tier Three.

Source: US Department of State (2001–2010).

BOX 1: HUMAN TRAFFICKING IN BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA

The change in Bosnia-Herzegovina’s status between 2001 and 2010 — from Tier Three to Tier One — illustrates the ability of international engagement to help improve conditions in the host country. Bosnia’s ability to better address human trafficking results in tangible security gains in Western Europe, the intended final destination for the trafficking operations. The contrasting excerpts concerning Bosnia from the State Department annual reports from 2001 and 2010 illustrate the cumulative impact of SSR in helping to address trafficking.

2001

“The central government’s ability to deter trafficking is limited by budgetary constraints, minimal border controls, inadequate criminal laws, and corruption. Some police and judicial authorities tacitly accept or actively facilitate trafficking. Neither of the entities has a law that specifically prohibits trafficking, although prosecutors can use charges of assault, provision of false documents, procuring and promoting prostitution” (US Department of State, 2001).

2010

“The Government of Bosnia fully complies with the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking. The government made clear progress in its anti-trafficking law enforcement efforts during the reporting period by significantly reducing its use of suspended sentences and imposing stronger penalties for convicted traffickers” (US Department of State, 2010).

effectively police their borders, develop clearer anti-trafficking laws and successfully prosecute offenders.

ARMS TRAFFICKING

A Global Threat

The global illicit trade in small arms threatens the domestic security of all states. Arms trafficking is a central

feature of the broader threat posed by transnational organized crime and one of its most destructive facets. The United States has long recognized organized crime as a national security threat, leading President Clinton to, in 1995, urge the UN General Assembly to work with the United States “to shut down the grey markets that outfit terrorists and criminals with firearms” (Federation of Atomic Scientists).

In cases such as Afghanistan, Angola and Nicaragua, vast quantities of weapons shipped by the United States and the Soviet Union to their proxies have long outlived their original Cold War purposes and, subsequently, found their way to other conflicts and clandestine actors. Afghanistan in particular remains one of the world's most highly armed countries, hosting hundreds of illegal armed groups bearing hundreds of thousands — if not millions — of weapons, according to Afghan and international military officials (Amnesty International, 2008: 2). As of 2009, demobilization, disarmament and reconstruction (DDR) efforts in Afghanistan had demobilized 62,376 combatants and collected 57,629 weapons, but immense challenges remain (Small Arms Survey [SAS], 2009). As the international community funnels tens of thousands of new weapons into the Afghan security sector, there are serious concerns about the secure storage, distribution and movement of these weapons in a situation of limited state capacity, poor accountability and continued corruption, including cases of missing or leaked military equipment (Amnesty International, 2008: 3, 5).

The very credible risk is that these weapons will continue to find their way into the hands of criminals, militants and terrorists who operate inside and outside of Afghanistan. The Soviet-made SA-7 shoulder-fired surface-to-air missile used in the failed 2002 attack on an Israeli airliner in Mombasa, Kenya — a weapon believed to have originated in Afghanistan¹³ — is just one troubling reminder of the risk posed by the thousands of such missiles outside of government control. SSR can mitigate this risk by further advancing DDR efforts, fostering accountability and reliable weapons management practices within the Afghan army and police forces (both

of whom Canada already assists) and improving border controls in known areas of transnational arms trafficking outside of Afghanistan. The OSCE, for example, has implemented a training program for border guards to prevent arms trafficking through the Termez-Hayraton “Friendship Bridge” checkpoint on the Afghanistan-Uzbekistan border (OSCE, 2002).

While Afghanistan demonstrates the scale and challenges of the arms-trafficking challenge, the case of Bosnia provides a clearer example of how internationally supported SSR can mitigate this threat.

Bosnia and the Global Trade in Arms

Post-conflict Bosnia exemplifies both the threat of transnational arms trafficking and the importance of SSR measures to the security of states beyond its borders. While the war in Bosnia (1992–1995) witnessed extensive smuggling of arms *into* the country, today these smuggling routes are used to transport illegal weapons *out of* Bosnia. Irregular Serb forces in Bosnia now engage in a criminal arms trade known to have supplied weapons to Western European terrorist groups, including the Real IRA in Ireland and the Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) in Spain (Davis, 2002: 55). According to one report, “Bosnia is widely regarded as one of the main transit points for importing arms, drugs and illegal immigrants into Europe” (Davis, 2002: 55). As of 2004, Bosnia’s State Border Service could only control 70–80 percent of the country’s borders, and its seizure capacity was demonstrably weak (Paes et al., 2004). In 2003, the State Border Service reported it had confiscated only 116 firearms; in neighbouring Kosovo, just one 2001 UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo seizure of arms smuggled from Bosnia included 318 AK-47 rifles, 1,008 rockets and 500 grenades (Paes et al., 2004: 31; Davis, 2002: 56). Improved border control capacity is, thus, a critical area in which SSR can make a significant contribution to the domestic security of any

13 An instructional training video explaining how to operate an SA-7 missile was traced to an al-Qaeda training camp in Afghanistan after a failed attack on Prince Sultan Air Base in Saudi Arabia in 2002. This was the same weapon used in the Mombasa, Kenya attack later that year (see Whitmire, 2006: 10).

nation that could one day be victimized by these illegally trafficked weapons.

Reducing the number of illegal weapons possessed by the Bosnian population through DDR programs was one of the chief priorities of the international community. The scale of the challenge was staggering: one survey estimated that the number of illegal weapons possessed by civilians in Bosnia was somewhere between 140,397 and 494,252, while approximately 20 percent of civilians admitted to owning a firearm. In post-conflict states such as Bosnia, SSR can contribute to disarmament efforts by creating a sense of security in the aftermath of conflict. While the Bosnian Ministry of the Interior was only able to confiscate 4,837 small arms and light weapons over the period from 1998 to 2003, NATO-led Operation Harvest collected 40,651 items between 1998 and February 2004 (Paes et al., 2004: 22, 25). However, attempts to regulate and collect arms in the civilian population are hindered by the diffusion of such powers from the federal level to the cantons, which have different policies and procedures surrounding weapons seizures (South Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons [SEESAC]: 2006). Fundamental political reforms and continued SSR engagement are required to improve this fragmented and inconsistent approach to small arms.

In addition to the ready availability of illegal weapons, there is also considerable concern that state arsenals could end up in the hands of criminals, combatants or terrorists. Bosnian weapon storage facilities do not meet minimum security standards (SEESAC, 2006: 30). The risk of theft was amply demonstrated in October 2005, when 5,000 explosive detonators — items of great utility to both organized crime and terrorist groups — were stolen from the Jahorinski Potok site (and fortunately recovered within days) (SEESAC, 2006: 25). Pervasive official corruption only heightens this risk. Faced with this situation and the attempted terrorist attack

on an Israeli airliner in Mombasa, Kenya in 2002, the US Embassy in Bosnia (supported by the embassies of Canada and the United Kingdom) initiated a buy-back program in December 2002 that recovered nearly 5,000 shoulder-launched surface-to-air missile systems possessed by the armed forces (Paes et al., 2004: 28). Fortunately, the European Union Force mission has gradually been improving the standards and practice of stockpile management (SEESAC, 2006: 30).

CASE STUDY CONCLUSIONS

The case studies demonstrate the limitations and imperfections of the SSR model, but at the same time show that SSR can make a tangible contribution to donor states' domestic security. Acknowledging the limitations of the SSR model can encourage a more realistic and analytical approach to selecting SSR missions. Even generally successful SSR engagements cannot be relied on to entirely eliminate transnational security threats.

A critical finding is that when programs lack balance and overemphasize specific SSR areas, often the military, even prolonged and lucrative funding commitments do not guarantee success in SSR. SSR is, at its core, a holistic process, which demands engagement across a range of areas to produce a positive net effect. In Mexico, the overarching focus of counternarcotics initiatives on reducing drug flows into the United States through widespread eradication and paramilitary interdiction, rather than the reform and expansion of the rule of law infrastructure and support for comprehensive rural development, reduced the impact of the programs. This shows that designing SSR missions with donor security interests almost exclusively in mind can distort SSR programming to such an extent that they can undermine those interests over the long term. SSR donor states must factor their own legitimate security and political interests into selecting and structuring their SSR engagements, but

they cannot dictate strategies or approaches. Immediate donor interests must be viewed in the context of the broader societal conditions and needs of the recipient state; only then can sustainable approaches be devised that balance the needs of the donor and recipient.

The case studies show that, in most contexts, SSR can logically be associated with domestic security gains for donor countries, even if the link cannot be directly proven. Just as SSR requires long-term commitment, the gains from SSR may be diffuse, and only accrue substantially over time. Likewise, the gains from SSR often continue long after donor programming has concluded, so future security dividends should be factored into the analysis of SSR missions.

SELECTING SSR INTERVENTIONS

To a certain degree, all SSR donors justify their international engagements with reference to humanitarian and international collective security goals; however, in practice, states tend to engage in SSR missions in countries where they have existing interests, either due to a prevailing security threat(s), long-standing diplomatic or development ties, or economic links. Some of the factors that influence the selection of SSR interventions are outlined in Table 4.

TABLE 4: MOTIVATIONS FOR SSR INTERVENTIONS

| Type of Intervention | Description | Examples |
|----------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Geographical | The donor country is compelled to respond to a crisis situation in its immediate vicinity or in a key strategic location (like a global commercial transportation artery or source of natural resources). | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - EU interventions in the Balkans and Eastern Europe. - US engagement in Mexico. - Canadian engagement in Haiti. - Australian engagement in Timor-Leste. |
| Humanitarian | The donor country has little direct interest in the host country, but engages in SSR to help foster economic development or protect human rights. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The Dutch SSR mission in Burundi. - Canada's engagement in Southern Sudan* and in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. |
| Peacekeeping | The donor country has taken part in a peacekeeping mission and remains involved in the country following the cessation of hostilities. Peacekeeping missions tend to evolve into longer-term engagements, often encompassing SSR activities. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - France's leadership in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (UN Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo). - Australia, Portugal and other major donors to Timor-Leste (following UN Mission in East Timor, UN Transitional Administration in East Timor). |
| Geostrategic | Involvement is based on real or perceived geostrategic interests, including security concerns/threats. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - US assistance to Pakistan. - US assistance to Yemen. |
| Historical/Colonial | The donor country has a specific interest in intervention because of historical ties (often through colonialism). | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - UK assistance to Sierra Leone. - France's engagement in Côte d'Ivoire. |
| Alliance Commitments | The donor country engages in SSR to fulfill commitments to alliances, treaties or multilateral organizations. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Canada's engagement in Afghanistan. |

*Canada has been engaged in Sudan's peace process since 1999. Canadian support "has been driven by the desire of the Canadian Government to address both Canadian and G8 foreign policy priorities for humanitarian concerns in Africa" (DFAIT, 2007a).

CANADA'S ENGAGEMENT

The SSR missions Canada has chosen to undertake fulfill at least one of these criteria, and often several simultaneously (see Table 5). The distinction between the different types of interventions is significant, because some have a much clearer domestic security rationale than others.

The number of actors engaged, the range of motivations at play and the variable level of the domestic security dividend makes the selection of SSR missions a complex puzzle. A better understanding of why Canada becomes involved in certain missions and not others will help lay the groundwork for a more systematic analysis of

Canada's SSR priorities. In all planning processes, the domestic security connection should be more clearly understood, so that planning can better reflect which missions are central to Canadian security and which are for humanitarian purposes.

Just as the *Canada First Defence Strategy* lays out a long-term vision of the development of Canada's military capacity, SSR planning should involve all stakeholders and take a higher-level, longer-term view that accounts for Canada's strengths and weaknesses, as well as our domestic security priorities and humanitarian goals.

TABLE 5: CANADA'S INTERNATIONAL ENGAGEMENT IN SSR, SELECTED COUNTRIES

| Country | Ministries Involved | Public Safety Portfolio Agencies Involved | Motivation for Intervention | Domestic Security Connection |
|------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Afghanistan | Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), DFAIT, Department of National Defence (DND), Public Safety | RCMP, CBSA, CSC | Geostrategic, Alliance Commitments (NATO), Humanitarian | Terrorism (al-Qaeda), regional security, refugees, transnational crime (heroin trafficking, organized crime), weapons of mass destruction (through regional instability threatening Pakistan). |
| Democratic Republic of Congo | CIDA, DFAIT, Public Safety | RCMP | Humanitarian, Post-Peacekeeping | None |
| Haiti | CIDA, DFAIT, DND, Justice Canada, Public Safety | RCMP, CSC | Humanitarian, Post-Peacekeeping, | Transnational crime (cocaine trafficking), refugees, money laundering, human trafficking. |
| Sudan | CIDA, DFAIT, Public Safety | RCMP | Humanitarian, Post-Peacekeeping | None |
| Palestinian Territories | CIDA, Justice Canada, Public Safety | RCMP | Geostrategic, Humanitarian | Little evidence of direct terrorist threat to Canada from Palestinian Territories. |
| Kosovo | Public Safety | RCMP | Humanitarian, Alliance Commitments (NATO) | None |
| Côte d'Ivoire | Public Safety | RCMP, CSC | Humanitarian | None |

CANADA'S CAPACITY AND COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGES IN CONTRIBUTING TO SSR ENGAGEMENTS

In the case of SSR, Canada's interests, values and capabilities converge, placing it in good stead not only to make significant contributions to SSR engagements, but also to become a leader in the continued development of the concept. Under the SSR umbrella, there are a number of niche areas in which Canada is particularly well equipped to operate. This section will identify major resource gaps in the SSR field with an eye to how Canada's strengths can be aligned to fill them.

Canada has distinguished itself as one of the international community's leaders in providing assistance to international policing missions and corrections reform programs, two areas that have either been under-resourced or poorly implemented in reform contexts. Corrections reform, in particular, can be described as a missing link in the SSR agenda, with donor states either unable to contribute adequate funds, due to domestic legal limitations, or unwilling to provide support, due to the political unattractiveness of the area. New innovations and donor champions are needed in the area to overcome the many obstacles facing reform programs. In the areas of police, corrections and justice reform, Canada has the capacity to make significant contributions.¹⁴

14 In addition to police and corrections reform, which will be discussed in detail in the following section, Canada has also distinguished itself in the area of justice reform, where its long-standing commitment to human rights, well-developed justice sector and dual legal tradition (common and civil law) have positioned the country to take on an international leadership role.

POLICE REFORM: THE IMPORTANCE OF INTERIOR MINISTRIES

"The most critical — and most often neglected — focus of SSR is the bureaucratic agency responsible for the police and other internal security forces" (Perito, 2009: 3).

Recent experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq have demonstrated the danger of prioritizing "boots on the ground," over institutional reform in the context of SSR.¹⁵ In the early stages of Afghanistan's police training mission, the Afghan Ministry of Interior (MoI) "lacked basic administrative systems for personnel, procurement, and logistics and the ability to oversee police operations," but was nevertheless assigned only one adviser by the German police assistance mission (Sedra, 2008: 193–196). Overall, "virtually no attention has been given to training the staff of the MoI in the management and administrative skills that they require" (Rathmell, 2007: 5). The lion's share of the US\$6 billion invested in the Afghan National Police has been directed to police training, with little consideration given to how those newly minted police will be managed and overseen. It is, therefore, of little surprise that the MoI has become perhaps the most corrupt and dysfunctional institution in the country, and a major obstacle to real gains in the SSR agenda. As Andrew Rathmell (2007: 5) states, training rank-and-file police is "of limited value if the higher levels are not also addressed."

One of the reasons for both the lack of prioritization of interior ministry reform and the poor performance in implementation has been the lack of qualified donor actors or champions to lead the process. Domestic departments or agencies from key donor states like the

15 Institutional reform is especially challenging for the police: "Building up institutions that [...] are to some degree insulated from society (e.g. militaries) can be achieved with relative ease. However, where public institutions are deeply embedded in society and are deeply involved in day to day social relations and conflicts, as are police institutions, then reform is much harder to achieve" (Rathmell, 2007: 4).

UK Home Office and the Canadian Department of Public Safety are precisely the bodies with the expertise, know-how and experience to mould sister agencies in troubled states, but they have remained on the sidelines of such processes, only engaging through ad hoc contributions of technical assistance. Their absence in the Afghan and Iraqi contexts has meant that military personnel, actors who characteristically lack the skill sets and mentality to do the job, have been forced to fill the void. Just as you would not hire police officials to train infantry soldiers, it is inappropriate for military officers to train police leaders or interior ministry officials. Moreover, if these bureaucratic institutions are to be civilianized, as SSR best practices would suggest, civilian mentors, not military or even police professionals, are needed. The Afghan and Iraqi experiences demonstrate the need for donor domestic security ministries and departments to engage in SSR as a full stakeholder, not merely as a provider of personnel.

The RCMP and Public Safety Canada are well placed to assume a more active role in the development of security sector governance structures in SSR contexts, if given the appropriate mandate. The RCMP boasts a national-level bureaucratic structure, with police officials experienced at managing large institutions. Public Safety Canada, as a national-level interior ministry, can provide officials with direct experience overseeing national-level infrastructure.

PRISON REFORM: THE DANGER OF DUNGEONS

“Allowing prisons to become overcrowded, inhumane dungeons is not just a problem from a human rights perspective; in the long run, it can be a threat to public, and even national, security.” (SAS, 2010: 177)

When it comes to SSR projects in conflict-affected states, corrections reform is typically driven by humanitarian considerations. However, the imperative to improve prison conditions also has direct national and international security ramifications.

SSR interventions suffer from a tendency to see corrections as a secondary priority, behind the police and judiciary, imitating the procedural chain in the rule of law system from arrest to trial to incarceration. Not only does this approach contradict SSR orthodoxy, which sees the three pillars as symbiotically interconnected and requiring parallel reform interventions, but it represents a fundamental misunderstanding of the role of corrections systems in the security sector and society.

Nearly all inmates of correctional institutions will eventually be released. Their prison experience plays a crucial role in shaping their attitudes toward state and society following their release. The most recent SAS annual report describes, in detail, the risks associated with organized crime and terrorist groups in prison. The report shows how unreformed prisons can become centres of indoctrination and training grounds for insurgent, criminal and terrorist groups. In other words, if left unaddressed, they can act as incubators for conflict and insecurity, undercutting any progress made in other elements of the SSR agenda. While incarceration at the individual level can make communities safer, at the aggregate level it can constitute a threat to national security.¹⁶

The need for corrections reform in Afghanistan was clearly articulated in General McChrystal’s *COMISAF’s Initial Assessment*. In Annex F, McChrystal summarizes the problems that a lack of corrections support has created:

16 As the SAS report notes: “putting criminals, gang members, rebels, paramilitaries, and other armed actors in jail does not neutralize them. On the contrary, for incarcerated groups, prisons can become tactical headquarters, organizational assets that expand their range of action and make them more resilient” (SAS, 2010: 178).

Taliban and Al Qaeda insurgents represent more than 2,500 of the 14,500 inmates in the increasingly crowded Afghan Corrections System (ACS). These detainees are currently radicalizing non-insurgent inmates and worsening an already over-crowded prison system. Hardened, committed Islamists are indiscriminately mixed with petty criminals and sex offenders, and they are using the opportunity to radicalize and indoctrinate them. In effect, insurgents use the ACS as a sanctuary and base to conduct lethal operations against GIROA and coalition forces (e.g., Serena Hotel bombing, [government] assassinations, governmental facility bombings). (McChrystal, 2009: 50)

Despite its importance, corrections reform frequently suffers from a lack of funding and attention from international donors. Notwithstanding legal barriers to funding, corrections reform is simply not perceived as a priority by many donors, who see the imperative of restoring immediate security and stability as requiring an overwhelming focus on police and military training. Corrections reform in Haiti is an excellent example. In spite of Haiti's deplorable prison conditions and an obvious need for resources, corrections has perennially been a low priority. Chief Corrections Advisor for the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), Lisa Quirion, said in a 2007 interview that "the problem is donor funding. 'Prisons' is not sexy. People want to build hospitals, they want to build schools, they want to put a well in the town, but nobody wants to invest in prisons" (DFAIT, 2007b).

Reflecting the department's effectiveness and international esteem, CSC has been asked to provide advice and assistance to numerous corrections reform programs across the world. For instance, since 2003, a Canadian corrections adviser has been seconded to the UN

Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) (see CSC, 2010a). Canada has also deployed corrections officials in volatile Kandahar Province through the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT). The officials played an important role in improving prison conditions in the province through training, infrastructure development and equipment acquisition projects (see CSC, 2010b). According to DFAIT's 2009 report on the Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force's (START) engagement in Haiti "[S]upport to the Police Sector and Prison sectors through MINUSTAH has been highly valued, [and] arguably Canada could enhance its impact with more targeted assistance that capitalizes on unique Canadian competencies through direct bilateral arrangements between the RCMP, CSC and their respective Haitian counterparts" (DFAIT, 2009: 7.4). There is clearly room for more substantive Canadian engagement in corrections reform under the leadership of Public Safety Canada, which will be able to leverage and build synergies between the contributions and competencies of various Canadian domestic security agencies.

CUSTOMS AND BORDER REFORM: BUILDING CAPACITY

"Weak rule-of-law is their breeding-ground; money laundering their bloodline; porous borders their highways..." (Ambassador Carlos Pais, Head of the OSCE Spillover Monitor Mission to Skopje; referring to transnational organized crime)

The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Development Assistance Committee (OECD DAC) *Handbook on SSR* states that "effective border controls are critical to any long-term strategy to reduce illicit trafficking in small arms, drugs and people across borders" (OECD-DAC, 2007: 154). Checking visas and commercial documents; the interdiction of

illegal trafficking and smuggling; the monitoring of cross-border population, money and commercial flows; and the sharing of information among national and international partners and agencies are only some of the critical activities that enable customs and border agencies to make contributions to domestic and international security. An effective border control regime demands a high level of cooperation between the customs and border service, intelligence bodies and the police, as well as regional and international partners. The OECD DAC *Handbook* stresses the importance of intraservice, interagency and international cooperation in border management (OECD DAC, 2007: 155).

Reforming a state's customs and border service is a complex task, largely because proper reform encompasses a wide range of actors and areas, primarily in the security and economic spheres. Successful reform will enable recipient governments to maintain control over which people and goods enter their borders, without unduly affecting legitimate travel and commerce. The revenue generated by collecting customs duties can be a major financial incentive for reform. Consequently, achieving successful customs and border reform will contribute to economic development goals by improving opportunities for cross-border tourism and trade.

The Canadian government has identified border security as one of its six priorities for Afghanistan, with the expectation that customs and border reform will "help promote economic development, stability, and security in the border region" (Government of Canada, 2010a). Canada has already made a significant contribution, pledging up to \$32 million in funding to border security initiatives.

Canada's recognition of the crucial role that customs and border reform plays in Afghanistan's reconstruction has helped position it to take on a leading role in the training of customs officials through the development of the Afghan

National Customs Academy (ANCA), which aims to train 150 to 200 recruits per year. The Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) "has developed context-specific training materials that will be used in the academy's curriculum and will be developing a Senior Management Development Program for the Academy. The agency has also provided a deputy dean and a senior trainer who are working with recruits and officials" (Khetab, 2010). Since the ANCA opened in January 2010, it has already trained its first class of 48 recruits, which graduated in March. The ANCA will also enable a "train the trainers" program so that "Afghans can train Afghans to ensure that the ANCA remains operational and is sustainable over the long term" (Government of Canada, 2010b).

ADDRESSING GAPS: CANADA'S CAPACITY

Translating Canada's comparative advantages into tangible contributions to SSR programs is challenging, largely because of the lack of a clear mandate for Public Safety Canada and some of its line departments to engage in this area. Their capacity is not easily replaced, "because the private sector/NGO partners do not have the knowledge or capabilities to deliver security functions that are normally a state monopoly" (START, 2010a: 11).

At the ministerial level, Public Safety Canada suffers from resource shortages in implementing justice and security sector reform programming. A START report, entitled *Canada's Engagement in Acutely Fragile States*, notes that: "J/SSR activities are comparatively expensive to implement as multiple staff must be deployed to volatile environments that require advanced security measures; and, few senior officers are willing to deploy to fragile states" (START, 2010a: 15). Public Safety Canada noted in a *Capacity Inventory Questionnaire* accompanying the START report that Public Safety Canada "has a domestic mandate and its program activity architecture

does not include programs, funding or personnel for building capacity in acutely fragile states” (START, 2010b: 3). Consequently, “the Department must shift the responsibilities of personnel away from domestic public safety program activities” (START, 2010b: 3).

The absence of a clear mandate, compounded by shortfalls in resources and funding rather than will or capacity, has prevented Canada from assuming a more pronounced global leadership role in these areas: “The Department is not mandated or resourced to support engagements in fragile states. Consequently, it encounters shortfalls when responding to the Government of Canada’s commitments in such states” (START, 2010b: 5). The report notes that “Public Safety does face a personnel challenge related to the growing pressures on a small staff to meet increasing demands for coordination in a growing number of identified fragile state crises. There is also a challenge for personnel in responding to a growing number of requests for security sector reform” (START, 2010b: 7).

CHARTING A PATH FOR PUBLIC SAFETY AND CANADA’S DOMESTIC SECURITY AGENCIES IN SSR

Canada has been a global leader in developing the SSR model through forums and multilateral agencies like the OECD DAC and the UN system. As noted in this report, Canada also features significant comparative advantages for supporting SSR in troubled states.

One of the dilemmas for SSR implementation highlighted in this paper is the lack of an effective framework to rapidly deploy civilian capacity to support the reform of domestic security agencies. While there is considerable experience in deploying policing missions — although even these missions are often insufficient in size and scope — capability to deploy adequate capacity in the

judicial, prison, intelligence and governance fields has been highly limited. Domestic security agencies in SSR-contributing states such as the United States, the United Kingdom and Canada have not been endowed with the resources or the mandate to fill these gaps, forcing donors to look to their militaries to do so. When domestic security agencies are tasked to contribute to international missions, they often do so without the appropriate rules, procedures, protocols and resources required to garner meaningful and effective change.

The key starting point for expanding Canada’s ability to support domestic security reforms under the auspices of SSR is to establish a clear mandate for Public Safety Canada and endow it with a defined budget for SSR-related activities, notably the deployment of internal and contracted experts to support SSR missions. The following are other steps that could be taken:

- Develop human capacity to undertake SSR missions within Public Safety Canada through targeted training on general SSR best practices and particular sub-areas, as well as mentoring/training methodology.
- Establish links with academic institutions and non-governmental organizations engaged in SSR to feed into the department’s expert analysis on specific countries and regions and to keep staff abreast of the latest trends, insight and best practices. Innovative research into key SSR issue areas should be supported to establish Canada as a leader in the field.
- Develop analytical capacity in the department to assess the needs of a particular SSR program, determine entry points for Canadian assistance, monitor progress and evaluate impact.
- Form an expert roster of Canadian SSR specialists. This can be housed in the department or subcontracted to a private sector or non-governmental entity. Those on the roster should either have general SSR

knowledge, sector-specific knowledge (like justice or prison reform) or country/region specific expertise. Candidates should have extensive field experience, be capable of rapid deployments and have received both security clearance and targeted training. Each expert roster member should receive a common contract that can be activated upon deployment. It is critical that the list is regularly monitored and updated. Efforts should be made to link the expert roster to those of other governments and international organizations.¹⁷

- Establish a set of indicators to assess the impact of SSR engagements. This matrix should seek to assess both in-country achievements and the longer-term impact on Canadian domestic security. As stated in this paper, this is a complex undertaking that should be based on a detailed assessment of the security linkages between the recipient state and Canada. This report, which Public Safety Canada is well placed to undertake, should be tied to the broader SSR needs assessment in the recipient country intended to inform and frame the country-specific strategy. That broader needs assessment, likely multi-lateral in nature, should suggest time-linked specific targets for SSR programming and outline potential strategies to achieve them. Indicators should be qualitative as well as quantitative, and focus on program outputs (effects) rather than inputs (resources invested). While this latter point seems intuitive, SSR programs are often measured by the resources applied rather than any change they have triggered. The linkage report should establish a matrix of potential short-, medium-, and long-term impacts of particular Canadian SSR interventions, with specifically outlined indicators to measure them. That matrix

must be modelled to consider a range of national, regional and international variables that could affect first- and second-order reform impacts. Continuous monitoring of the situation in the country and the impacts of reforms, with reference to the matrix, requires investments in analytical capacity.

- Establish a system to debrief staff returning from SSR missions to capture experiences and lessons learned. This should be incorporated into a database or manual of lessons learned, which should act as a living document influencing policy and practice.
- Establish new human resource policies for staff deployed abroad in support of SSR programs. Contracts should feature clauses providing for overseas missions and appropriate incentives for staff willing to serve abroad.
- Links should be established with partner governments and agencies engaged in domestic security reforms under the auspices of the SSR process. Coordination frameworks and common approaches should be developed.
- A whole-of-government SSR framework should be finalized and widely disseminated.

For the Ministry of Public Safety to implement any or all of these recommendations, its mandate to support SSR must be clarified and expanded; it requires a defined budget or resource allocation to support activities, as well as investments in human resources with specific SSR analytical capacity. It is important that Public Safety Canada be framed as a full partner in the Canadian SSR project and not merely as an umbrella body that facilitates the sourcing of personnel. It should evolve into the main policy contact point on all issues relating to the domestic security dimensions of SSR abroad. It is, of course, also uniquely suited to assess the impacts of that programming on Canadian domestic security.

¹⁷ For a good analysis of the principles that should be applied in establishing an expert roster from a UK perspective, see Stabilisation Unit (2010).

CONCLUSION

Canada can make a contribution to the development of the SSR concept by establishing a coherent and holistic framework for its domestic security and justice agencies to contribute to SSR missions. Considering the impact failed states can potentially have on Canadian domestic security, such an investment is justifiable. This framework should be selective, capable of choosing environments where Canadian comparative advantages can be most effectively leveraged, and be adaptable, able to evolve with changing conditions and best practices. The framework should also emphasize measurable results. It should seek to assess the impact of SSR on Canadian domestic security, while recognizing at the same time that such goals must be balanced against a number of other considerations, such as the imperative of improving the human security plight of the host country's citizens. Domestic security provides a compelling rationale for engaging in SSR programs and should influence program design, but it should not define the form of assistance provided, something that can undercut and even distort SSR processes.

With the SSR concept just over a decade old, we can see it moving into a new phase of its development — a second generation SSR or SSR 2.0. In this second phase, new approaches and ideas are being developed to narrow the policy-practice divide and align the SSR model with conditions on the ground in SSR contexts. Moreover, new tools and approaches are being developed on the basis of empirical study of a decade's worth of SSR cases. Canada can play a unique role in this exercise, building on its success in developing assistance programs for the RCMP, CBSA and CSC to form a concerted and coordinated framework to support domestic security reforms that address host country needs, influence Canadian domestic security and emphasize Canadian values and principles.

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ANNEX: CONSENSUS AMONG MAJOR SSR STAKEHOLDERS

| | Canada: <i>Canada First Defence Strategy</i> (2008); <i>Securing an Open Society</i> (2004); <i>Canada's International Policy Statement</i> (2005). | United States: <i>National Security Strategy</i> (2010). | United Kingdom: <i>Security in an Interdependent World</i> (2008); <i>Security for the Next Generation</i> (2009) | Netherlands: <i>Netherlands National Security Strategy</i> (2007) |
|---------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| On the connection between international and domestic security | "But as all Canadians know, we live in an increasingly interconnected, complex and often dangerous world. The increase in terrorist acts and the threat of rapid, globalized spread of infectious disease all challenge our society and the sense of security that is so critical to our quality of life." (<i>Securing an Open Society</i> , vii) | "The threats to our people, our homeland, and our interests have shifted dramatically in the last 20 years... Instead of a hostile expansionist empire, we now face a diverse array of challenges, from a loose network of violent extremists to states that flout international norms or face internal collapse." (17) | "But recent events have brought home to us how, in this global age, instability anywhere in the world can affect our interests and ultimately our security more quickly and in more fundamental ways than ever before." (<i>Security in an Interdependent World</i> , 3) | "Our national security, however, cannot be viewed in isolation from the security of other countries, in particular those of our European partners and NATO allies. This also explains why internal security policy...and Dutch international security policy are so closely linked." (9) "National security cannot be safeguarded by national measures alone. Continuing globalisation entails that developments occurring far beyond our national borders can directly or indirectly affect our security." (35) |
| On the threat of failed and fragile states | "Globalization means that developments abroad can have a profound impact on the safety and interests of Canadians at home. Indeed, the terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001 and those carried out since, demonstrate how instability and state failure in distant lands can directly affect our own security and that of our allies." (<i>Canada First Defence Strategy</i> , 6) | "The United States must improve its capability to strengthen the security of states at risk of conflict and violence. We will undertake long-term, sustained efforts to strengthen the capacity of security forces to guarantee internal security, defend against external threats, and promote regional security and respect for human rights and the rule of law." (26) | "Poverty, inequality and poor governance can exacerbate the impact of violent conflict, organised crime, and terrorism, among other factors, and can inhibit an effective response to these threats. This means that vulnerable, fragile states and systemic global poverty have implications for UK national security, whether manifested in the form of illegal weapons smuggling by organized criminals, or the threat from terrorism." (<i>Security in an Interdependent World</i> , 9) | N/A |
| On domestic security threats | "Based on the current threat environment, we have placed the highest priority on countering international terrorism, preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, assisting failed and failing states, and defusing intra- and interstate conflicts that threaten our national security." (<i>Securing an Open Society</i> , 48) | "Instead of a hostile expansionist empire, we now face a diverse array of challenges, from a loose network of violent extremists to states that flout international norms or face internal collapse." (17) | "These 'threat actors' include... <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • non-state actors – terrorists, insurgents and other non-state actors motivated by ideology - transnational organised criminals – people motivated by pecuniary rather than ideological motives." (<i>Security for the Next Generation</i> , 65) | Breaches of international peace and Security, CBRN (chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear) weapons, Terrorism, International organised crime, Climate change and natural disasters, Outbreak of infectious diseases and animal diseases (18). |

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